Blue Bird

-Pritam S Rana

Fair n' flabby,
Gay n' happy

Cute n' blue,
Small black shoe

Beautiful bird,
Able shepherd

Modern day dainty fairy,
Bless thee, merry, merry.

Notes: This poem is is inspired by a combination of Renoir's Loge and Brig. Gen. Suzi Yogev. The Metro driver is only a symbol.

Correct approach will address insurgency

Updated: 20/12/2005 19:08 NST (+5:45 GMT) Current: 21/12/2005 11:22:58 NST Kathmandu

Dr Thomas A Marks
Dr. Thomas A. Marks is a political risk consultant based in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. He is a scholar with hundreds of articles and research papers (including books on Maoist insurgencies worldwide) to his credit.
He frequently visits Nepal to study the ongoing conflict. Dr. Marks regularly contributes to numerous publications that deal with insurgency and terrorism.
He talked to P Rana of Nepaleyes on his recent visit here. Excerpts: :
How do you analyze the conflict in Nepal? Any likelihood of peace, or will one side prevail decisively?
Let us be frank: Miscues by all concerned have resulted in stalemate. The Maoists, having established themselves in rural areas, have come face-to-face with the structural realities underlying Nepali underdevelopment. The result is marauding gangs of young people who are rapidly becoming minor warlords. Maoist misbehavior and miscalculation have given them a rump state with the GDP of the Sahara
Desert and a sullen, resentful, captive population. Maoist illegitimacy, however, cannot be exploited by a state that has not resolved its own issues of legitimacy. These require little elaboration by me, save to state the obvious. Having proceeded erratically in its approach to the insurgency, the state finds its political
position weak and its security forces, stronger though they are, able to project power anywhere but unable to remain and consolidate gains. Instances of indiscipline remain common enough to negate the advantage provided by the Maoists’ own problems with indiscipline, unbridled kidnapping, murder, and robbery. The major political parties, hamstrung as ever by their lack of vision and determination to engage in
obstructionism, have decided that their battle with the monarchy takes precedence over all else. “Peace” is the card they are presently playing in their bid to return to power. Yet there is not an inkling that they have given any more thought now to the particulars of good governance than they did previously in their decade
of mismanagement. They simply state that they have learned their lesson. As for the foreign presence: it is fairly evenly divided between those working behind-the-scenes to bring down the royal government and those wishing “compromise” could be rendered into Nepali. In summation, no side is able to prevail decisively, and the likelihood is for more of the same.
If the Maoists somehow win and take over Nepal, can they sustain their radical regime given Nepal's geopolitical situation and the current international system?
As I have stated earlier in this forum, key to the nature of such a hypothetical regime is what the Maoists are really after. One thing for sure, they simply are not saying what the political parties claim they are saying.
This evidence is not hard to come by – the Maoists themselves disseminate it. Pris oners and captured documents confirm it. Leaving this point aside and moving further to address your question, it is noteworthy that no radical regime in the past century has been able to sustain itself, unless one places in that category
North Korea. Still, as with its predecessors, North Korea is collapsing. But in collapsing, radical dictatorships have always functioned as killing machines. This is integral to the nature of the beast. They ultimately find themselves isolated, unable to go on. In the short-term, though, such regimes can find support for their
crimes. Simply look south, where on the 16th (of this month) the Indian legal Marxists rallied in support of not only Pyongyang but of those other shining examples of democracy and development – Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela – and the Nepalese Maoists and their Seven-Party Alliance pseudo-comrades! India itself,
winking at the actions of left-wing members of the ruling coalition, is foolish in thinking it can “buy off” the Nepali Maoists, even as New Delhi’s own Maoist problem surges.

You have intensively studied the conflict in Colombia. Do you see parallels between Nepal and Colombia? Can we learn anything?
Both major insurgent groups in Colombia see themselves as Marxist-Leninist: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, and the National Liberation Army, or ELN. They are not Maoist but advance many of the same hackneyed slogans and programs as does the CPN (M). FARC does utilize for its operational doctrine the same “people’s war” approach as the Nepalese Maoists, so one sees a close
correspondence in developments on the ground. In fact, by mid-1998 in Colombia, elimination of police presence, attacks upon government main forces, and lack of national strategy and planning had produced a serious situation that some saw as stalemate. That events have turned around so dramatically does offer
lessons for Nepal. A federal system of democracy, based upon maturing local autonomy, especially at the local level, produced a superb wartime president in Alvaro Uribe. He was able to implement an integrated, multifaceted strategy to Colombia’s challenges by using a greatly reformed military as the shield behind
which social and economic development could further political legitimacy. Negotiations are part of Uribe’s approach, but all has depended upon security forces that, in 2005, are better than those of most NATO member states – and only vaguely resemble those of, say, 1995, when the situation began to deteriorate.
Defense experts in Nepal say the government lacks coherent military strategy to defeat/contain the insurgency. What advice would you offer to the government?
Any military strategy must exist only to facilitate the political struggle, which in turn includes the economic and social campaigns. The Maoists, as the counter-state, are quite aware of this and have played their cards rather better than the state. The generic advice is as simple in concept as it is complex in implementation. A
counterinsurgency campaign gets in place that which is correct and sustainable, then it plays for the breaks.
A “correct” approach is one that addresses the causes of the insurgency. Legitimacy is always the center of gravity, certainly it is in this case. A “sustainable” approach is defined by the state itself, most particularly in terms of human and fiscal cost. “The breaks” come from those shifts in internal and/or external
circumstances that lead to a change in the correlation of forces. Countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, and Peru have all been through this process. Operationally, what they did was set in motion a plan that built upon local democratic capacity, sound governance, micro-development, and social equality in order to mobilize the state against the Maoist “new order.” They all articulated a vision. It is not enough to fight against something; you must fight for something. If you can’t state why you fight, you’re lost.

Do you, as an expert see the insurgents serious about peace and their commitment to multi-party democracy this time?
What is noteworthy about Maoist insurgencies is that they say and advocate the same things – and they all claim they will be “different,” avoid the crimes of the past. Unfortunately, the crimes are part and parcel of the structural “answer” they advance to society’s ills. It’s simply too easy, under a dictatorship of the
proletariat, by whatever cover name, to stop trying to convince people and to kill them instead. Yes, the Nepali Maoists have stated that they will be different. Yet their strategy has been textbook in all its particulars, right down to the present use of nonviolent means to accomplish violent ends. They see themselves at an epochal moment when they can play Mr Outside to the seven parties Mr Inside, classic
salami tactics of the first (Leninist) order. This is also what they are telling their people. Does this mean there is no room for accommodation? Certainly not – but not under the terms of reference as tabled by the UML, claiming to faithfully represent what the Maoists have undertaken. The UML is either naïve or quibbling. The
Maoists have stated quite clearly that “absolute democracy” – which means ousting the monarchy – is to be achieved by a united front (they use other terms) of themselves and the seven-parties. That doesn’t sound like compromise.
Do you think the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) is under equipped to deal with the rebels? If yes, what does it need? Leadership, strategy, materials or all of them?
RNA needs to be part of a national strategy for democratic governance. Tangible weapons are secondary to intangible ones, such as leadership and planning. Operationally, RNA has not yet accepted that there is no way around the classic force-multiplication conundrum inherent to counterinsurgency save through
mobilizing local forces. Call them Home Guards, call them neighborhood watch; debate all you like whether they are to be armed with their agricultural implements, firearms, radios, or simply whistles; when all is said and done, security forces must duplicate what the Maoists have done – mobilize a mass base. It is Maoist
crimes that allow this to be done, whether one talks about the Thai Maoists’ attacks upon the monarchy, or the Philippine Maoists’ attacks upon restored democracy, or the Peruvian Maoists’ savagery. Nepal’s Maoists have behaved in similar fashion, despite the efforts of their apologists to paint them as Robin Hoods. What is needed, then, is not weapons as I believe you have in mind but rather the ultimate weapon (ask the Maoists!), mobilization. But mobilization only works if it grows out of democratic capacity. The Maoists have shown that their version of society is youth gangs led by apostate teachers and politicians from the old-order. A Nepal that is to stand against that version must be a Nepal that grows out of the
demand for democracy but channels it into constructive action, such as development of hydropower. Notice where we’ve come: mobilization comes from local democracy extending to national democracy; it comes from enforcing the already passed laws of social equality; it comes from finding a means to deal with corruption and to institute good governance; it comes from economic development that will be built upon
micro-development. And that micro-development needs to move beyond the tired solutions of the development community and tap the “liquid gold” that makes Nepal second in the entire world in hydropower “reserves.” As odd as it sounds, this country should be an Asian Switzerland, not a conflicted basket case.
Realizing that is what counterinsurgency is all about – the RNA has to provide the shield behind which is happens.

Has the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) lost much popular support? If this is so, would you like to suggest anything on how an embattled army can manage its image?
In any conflict of any sort, whether a civil rights campaign or general warfare, information shapes reality. That is why no state can simply state, “We allow a free press,” and leave it at that. Even before the Maoist insurgency began, Nepal’s media were only just beginning to come to grips with issues of accuracy, accountability, and professionalism. In no area were they more deficient than in knowledge of conflict. Add to this an isolation bred of position, and you have a recipe for what you see today, a mix of the very good and the very, very bad. RNA, early on, produced some personalities who demonstrated an understanding that media were no longer an annex to the operations order, rather the very oxygen which all involved in the struggle breathed. These RNA personalities were targeted by the Maoists, consequently their policies languished. In targeting them, the Maoists knew very well what they were doing. The result today is the active hostility of much of the media to anything save parochialism, whereby even standard issues of state
interest and responsibility are considered an infringement upon “freedom of the press.” Combine this with the “learning curve” that the security forces have been going through in moving from a peacetime army to one on a war footing; add the involvement of international human rights organizations and their own narrow
view of “human rights,” and the result is on full display here. The security forces are labeled the enemy.

As a US citizen, do you think the US government should provide military aid to Nepal? Is there any US interest involved in either helping Nepal defeat the insurgency or letting the Nepali government fend for itself?

Yes, the US has and should continue to assist Nepal. Military aid to a legitimate government is part and parcel of that. It is the question of legitimacy, as determined by our law, that places the US in the difficult position it now occupies. On the one hand, it has long been a major force for development in Nepal. On the
other hand, security assistance is a normal part of our relations with the country. Now, amidst the conflict we are discussing, one can appreciate the delicate line any embassy must walk. It wants things “to work out.” Ironically, all the elements necessary for compromise would seem to be present – but men of good will, shall
we say, are in short supply. But let us end where we began, by speaking frankly: you can’t believe in Maoism and not have given up your critical faculties. You can’t claim to be a citizen of a global community in this day and age yet put up pictures of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. Why not add Hitler? Or Pol Pot? In that
sense, the Maoists have played their cards very poorly, because they claim to be “good guys” even as they wave the bloody red banner responsible for the greatest crimes humanity has ever witnessed. Thus the US, while willing to examine tactically all viable forms of compromise, strategically will remain committed to a set
of principles and their tangible expression that is quite the opposite of those trumpeted repeatedly by the Maoists. If the Maoists are serious about compromise – and the UML, for that matter – let them put away the butchers’ pictures and furl up the flag of tyranny – and walk like democrats rather than simply talk.

Response to Kaemer

Karl-Heinz Kraemer
Department of Political Science of South Asia, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg



Democratization and political parties in Nepal

Lecture presented at the South Asia Seminar, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
March 19, 1999

Introduction: State formation and society


About 250 years have passed since Nepal was transformed into a nation state by the military expansion of the small kingdom of Gorkha (Stiller 1975). The numerous mini states that had prior existed on the territory of the new state had been geographically and economically secluded autonomous agrarian societies. Their respective population had been a number of ethnic groups with divergent social structures along their respective religious, cultural, social, economic and legal necessities.

After the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814-16), which brought the Gorkhali expansion to an end, the Nepali state tried for political, administrative and legal unity. The final result of this endeavour was the muluki ain of 1854, Nepal's first legal code, based on Hindu law and the social and cultural values and structures of former Gorkha. But it also contained a number of compromises towards values and practices of non-Hindu groups. The most important element of the muluki ain was, that the Hindu social order was applied to the whole state. Numerous ethnic groups found themselves only in the lower social strata as castes (A. Höfer 1979). As a consequence, all political, social and economic power exclusively lay in the hands of members of the high Hindu castes, while there was no chance of participation for the other population groups.

The development of civil society was further hindered by the Ranas who usurped all power from 1846 to 1951. With British support they secluded Nepal hermetically from the outside world and exploited the country for the sake of their own pockets and prevented every kind of social development. People from outside the Rana-family had no chance of education and participation. Even high Hindu castes favoured by the muluki ain were degraded to minor figures of the Rana-state. It were especially the latter who went to India in the first half of the 20th century, where they used better chances for education at Indian schools and universities.

Political parties and the introduction of democratic ideas


A side-effect of this education in India has been the growing political consciousness of the exiled Nepalis. They got entrance to western political ideas and many of them actively took part in the Indian independence movement. Quite a number of them were members of the Indian National Congress, while others joined the Communist Party of India. At the time when the Ranas prevented the formation of political and social organizations in Nepal, the emigrant Nepalis were even able to found political parties in India. In January 1947 some minor political and student organizations on the initiative of B. P. Koirala joined under the name of Nepali Rastriya Congress (Nepali National Congress). Other important parties formed in the Indian exile in the late forties were the Nepali Prajatantrik Congress (Nepali Democratic Congress) and the Nepal Communist Party.

When the British left India the Rana government deviated from the principle of political isolation and tried for international recognition by extending diplomatic relations to evade political pressure from India. The independent India regarding the Rana system as outdated and tyrannical showed growing support for oppositional politics in Nepal, especially among the exiled Nepalis living in India. But accruing from this was the danger of Nepali dependency from India and of loosing her identity. This had a very negative impact on the Indo-Nepali relations during the following decades. Leading Indian politicians time and again not only stressed the close historical and cultural foundations of both countries, but even went as far as saying that Nepal had always been a part of India. These declarations were confirmed by exiled Nepali leaders, who being mainly members of high Hindu castes stressed their descent from India. For example during the founding session of the Nepali Rastriya Congress in 1947 the then president of the Indian National Congress, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, declared,

Nepal was always a part of India. Thus, Nepal's economic and political development is dependent upon free India. (Prem R. Uprety 1992:93)

And B. P. Koirala took almost the same stand when he said,

Actually Nepal and India are not two countries. From racial, religious, and economic perspective and in all respects Nepal is a major organ of India. Today the political difference you find is basically the game of selfish diplomats and politicians. (Prem R. Uprety 1992:94)

Nepal's political events of 1950/51 have often been praised as a people's revolution (janakranti) (Bhuvanlal Pradhan 1991). This proves problematic because political changes were not brought about by the masses, but they were the result of the cooperation of internal and external forces in a highly effective regional political situation. Independent India was looking for internal stability and external security. In face of the Chinese invasion of Tibet and declared Chinese claims for the Himalayan region, the rotten Rana system and the actions of exiled Nepalis in India constituted an enormous threat to Indian interests. So, India was looking for a system that satisfied Nepal's three political interest groups – Ranas, King and the young party politicians – and that at the same time gave India direct control over the political affairs in Nepal.

This throws another light upon the events of 1950/51. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship of July 31, 1950, gave the Ranas a last hope for the survival of their political system, but at the same time it guaranteed the continuation of Indian influence and infiltration of Nepal. The toleration and unofficial support of the armed rebellion of the Nepali Congress confirmed the politicians of that party in their positive view of India and kept them dreaming of creating a democratic Nepal with Indian support. King Tribhuvan's flight arranged by India and the so-called Delhi compromise initiated by Nehru in discussions with the Ranas and King Tribhuvan finally led to the restoration of monarchy in combination with special democratic elements (Grisma Bahadur Devkota 1960-83: vol. I:40-1; R. S. Chauhan 1971:33).

Thus, the events of 1950/51 have not been a turning point for the Nepali civilization. They only brought the replacement of one autocratic government, that of the Ranas, by another one, that of the Shah kings, with a mere touch of democracy. As a result of this unfinished political change the fifties became the stage of power struggle between the traditional feudal forces, represented by the institution of monarchy, and the young but totally inexperienced leaders of the political parties. The more the party politicians demonstrating their own incompetence turned for advice to India the more could the king as "father of the revolution" play to the gallery as unifying bond, symbol of the nation and popular leader. This already started in the early fifties under the ailing King Tribhuvan who played the party leaders off against each other. By several amendments of the initially democratic interim constitution of 1951, Tribhuvan stabilized his political position in the sense of an absolute monarch and successfully foiled elections for a constituent assembly.

Nationalism and the meaning of democracy


This became even clearer under his son Mahendra who ascended the throne in 1955. Mahendra tried to free Nepal from her strong Indian dependency introduced in follow-up of the events of 1950/51. For this reason he transformed Nepali nationalism by referring to stated traditional values. These were identical with those of the early Nepali nation state as reflected by the muluki ain of 1854: the Shah monarchy, the Hindu culture with its social and legal order, and the propagation of Nepali as the official and later national language of the country. Mahendra got in direct touch with the people and presented himself as the leader of the nation who was to the utmost concerned about the welfare of his "subjects". With the separation from India being a fundamental aspect of his new nationalist ideology, Mahendra demonstrated that the party leaders had too close connections to Indian parties and politicians.

At the same time the Nepali parties and their leaders did little to counter this negative impression. Most of the time the parties were struck by inter- and intra-party struggles caused by different leaders striving for power. At the same time they missed any kind of feeling for the real problems of the masses. Most of the party leaders belonged to an elite of high Hindu caste members educated in India and belonging to the urban middle class. Many of them had no knowledge of the hardships of the mainly rural population of the country. The poor masses, on the other hand, lacking education and political consciousness had no access to the democratic institutions of representation and participation offered by the political parties. They were more open to the arguments of King Mahendra who as raja represented a political institution well known in the mountain region for centuries.

In 1959 the people for the first time could decide about the composition of a parliament in common and free elections. But the convincing victory of the Nepali Congress (NC) winning 74 out of 109 seats could not hide the fact that the process of democratization had suffered severe setbacks during the fifties. Not only had the democratic forces represented by the political parties to do without elections for a constituent assembly that had been part of the Delhi compromise of 1951, but they even had to accept a constitution, enacted only one week before the elections, that clearly bore King Mahendra's marks. The king promulgated the constitution

in exercise of the sovereign powers of the Kingdom of Nepal and prerogatives vesting in Us in accordance with the traditions and custom of Our country and which devolved on Us from Our August and Respected forefathers. (preamble, see P. Neupane 1969:87)

There was no word about the introduction of a democratic system. Instead the preamble spoke about the "establishment of an efficient monarchical form of government". The supremacy of the king was further elucidated by calling the people his "subjects".

All executive power lay in the hands of the monarch and was to be "exercised by him either directly or through ministers or other officers subordinate to him" (article 10). The latter had only the right to convey recommendations. The power distribution in the legislative sphere was similar. There was a parliament,

which shall consist of His Majesty and two Houses, to be known respectively as the Senate (mahasabha) and the House of Representatives (pratinidhi sabha) (article 18).

All bills presented in parliament needed royal assent, and it was in the king's discretion whether to give or to withhold this assent (article 42). Already a sketchy glance at the functions and powers of parliament made clear that the Nepali parliament of 1959 was hardly able to represent public opinion or even to introduce socio-political changes. Rather the king could seize all parliamentary power without violating the constitution (Parmanand 1982:202-3). Within the judicial sphere, the absolute power of the monarch was not directly mentioned, but it could be derived from his right to appoint or remove the judges of the Supreme Court (article 57).

Of special importance were the regulations of articles 55 and 56 which gave the king the right to cancel the constitution or parts of it in cases of emergency. Especially mentioned was the case when the parliamentary system should prove unable to function. These emergency articles were King Mahendra's final means in case he should lose control over the political power. He used them in December 1960 when he dissolved the parliamentary system after only one and a half years and introduced the partyless panchayat system, that was to be in power until 1990.

So, the short parliamentary interlude of 1959/60 must be interpreted less as a victory of democratic forces than as an epilogue of the democratic experiments of the 1950s. The difference compared to former governments was that the Koirala government was not nominated by the king but elected by the people. Even though the NC hat a great majority in parliament the party had no constitutional right to implement decisions; according to the constitution, this right lay in the hands of the king. But Prime Minister B. P. Koirala nevertheless behaved as if he had a democratic legitimation corresponding to western conceptions. This gave the impression to the outside world that democracy had entered Nepal, but at the same time it provoked the intervention of King Mahendra, who obviously had been surprised by the overwhelming victory of the NC.

If Mahendra wanted to finish the restoration of absolute royal power, then he had to put an end to the politics of B. P. Koirala and his party. He had to introduce a system based on Nepali traditions of state and politics but containing elements that satisfied the younger generation which had come under western influences. So King Mahendra praised the new panchayat system as an indigenous one:

We have to open up a new spring of power which will remove the centuries-old poverty, ignorance, and backwardness of the country and which will nourish to maturity and fruitfulness the tree of democracy rooted in our soil and suited to our conditions. Since Panchayats are the basis of democracy and a democratic system imposed from above has proved unsuitable, as is apparent from the present experience of the country, we have now to build democracy gradually layer by layer from the bottom upwards. It is our aim to associate the people in the administration at all levels and to develop village, district, and municipal Panchayats.

In this context Mahendra spoke about a process of national reconstruction. Nepal's history verifies that at least till 1951 the people had only been exploited, and this abuse had little changed during the experimental phase of the 1950s. With the introduction of a parliamentary system in 1959 only a precondition for broader participation of the masses had been fulfilled. So, if there had been something to reconstruct after the forceful dissolution of this hopeful political system, then it must have been institutions which had existed before 1959 and which had been endangered by parliamentary democracy, and that were the monarchy, the Brahmans and the old feudal elites. Together with western democratic conceptions, liberal ideas and western socio-cultural values had entered the country. With the cancellation of these influences and the dismissal of a parliamentary democracy of western style King Mahendra had the ulterior motive of reconstructing absolute royal power. He could count on the support of all those forces that had benefited from the conservative traditional system, and these were the upholders of the Hindu social order, i. e. the Bahuns, and those members of high Hindu castes upon whom after the unification of the country in the 18th/19th century – in some parts of western Nepal even earlier – the Shah kings had transferred land previously belonging to ethnic groups.

Calling the panchayat system a traditional Nepali system, Mahendra could fall back upon the new national consciousness he had forced to be built up during the late 1950s. Especially the educated elites recognized, that Nepal had to safeguard her own cultural and political identity, if it did not want to be absorbed by India. Many Nepalis thought that this danger was greatest under a western democratic system with political parties founded on Indian soil and having very close relations to Indian parties and politicians. So, Mahendra also had the support of the new intelligentsia, a fact that might explain why so many young members of the banned political parties joined the new system in its early days. Right from the beginning, the king co-operated with these young men of the second generation of party politicians, most of them from the NC.

The constitution of 1962 for the first time officially identified Nepal as a Hindu kingdom. Since Nepal was a multiethnic state – even though it was not called so at that time – monarchy was described as the unifying factor of the nation. According to Hindu philosophy it was assumed in an ethnocentric manner that also the numerous non-Hindu people of the country accepted and respected the Hindu king in the same way. This "self-identification" of the Nepali people was taken for granted in article 2 of the panchayat constitution.

King Mahendra’s brutal actions against the banned political parties and their western democratic ideology nipped every kind of resistance in the bud. For many years the party leaders, as far as they had not been imprisoned, could only be active in Indian exile, a situation well-known from Rana times. It took until the seventies that parties again intensified underground activities in Nepal as well. They began with militant communist riots in Eastern Nepal; later also the NC adopted such tactics. Student unrest in spring 1979 finally caused King Birendra, who succeeded his father in 1972, to hold a referendum on the future of the political system.

Even though the party politicians received no governmental support, they, for the first time since 1960, could openly talk about their political opinions. As in the 1950s, irreconcilable differences between parties or politicians prevented the close cooperation of the political parties, which was especially rejected by B. P. Koirala and his Nepali Congress. The consequence was the defeat of the party political side in the national referendum of May 1980 (G. Acharya 1985; L. R. Baral 1983). But the other option had been an amendment of the constitution, and this brought the opening of the system and gave the political parties an opportunity for infiltration. Again, it were communist splinter groups which first made use of this chance, having members of their parties been elected into functions of the panchayat system. After 1986 the NC cautiously did the same.

At the end of this development stood the people's movement of spring 1990 with its far reaching consequences: abolition of the panchayat system, transformation of the absolute monarchy into a constitutional one and introduction of multiparty democracy. This development was possible, since NC and Communists worked together for the first time. But the success of the movement came so quickly, because of great mass participation, which was not confined to urban areas. Different from 1950/51 it was not the movement of a small elite of mainly high caste Hindus, but members of all strata of society took part. Remarkable was the forefront participation of groups that had especially been discriminated under the Hindu state in modern Nepal: organizations of ethnic groups, low Hindu castes and women in general. Similar to the political parties these groups had used the liberalised panchayat system of the eighties to organize themselves.

Institutionalization of democracy


Correspondingly high were the expectations upon the "new" Nepal in 1990. Nine years have passed since then and the initial euphoria has been replaced by disillusionment and frustration. The reasons are different. On the one hand had the expectations been too high in 1990; also a democratic government could not do wonders in one of the poorest countries of the world. On the other hand showed the newly responsible persons rather soon the same kind of misbehaviour that previously had been criticized as typical for the panchayat system. This caused popular slogans like "nothing has changed, only persons have been exchanged" or "previously corruption happened in a hidden way, now we have democracy and so it is done in public".

The constitution of 1990 is the legal basis of the current political system of Nepal. It has been drafted within a few months by representatives of the NC and the left parties that had jointly organized the movement. These people tried to lay the foundations for a democratic system, but at the same time they avoided radical changes. This resulted in numerous compromises with the conservative feudal forces. The most serious change was that one from a partyless to a multiparty system. Another important change concerned the monarchy. King Birendra became a constitutional monarch who in almost all actions depends upon the prior recommendations of the democratically elected government. This means that the original aim of the 1950 revolutionaries of the NC, which had been foiled by the Delhi compromise had been achieved 40 years later.

One of the striking features of the preamble of the new constitution is the special emphasis of public will. The sovereignty lies in the hands of the people, and the constitution has been drafted with the greatest possible participation of the masses. Adult franchise, the parliamentary system of government, constitutional monarchy and the system of multiparty democracy are emphasized as cornerstones of the constitution. The rule of law shall be a living reality on the basis of freedom and equality for all Nepali citizens, and it shall be guaranteed by an independent and competent system of justice.

The constitutional feature most restricting for social development is the concession towards conservative forces in the definition of the kingdom (adhirajya):

Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and constitutional monarchical kingdom. (article 4)

New are the terms multiethnic, multilingual and democratic, aspects that had been stressed during the movement and at the time of constitution drafting. But the makers of the constitution rejected the idea of a secular state which had so vehemently been demanded by the left parties and by the many non-Hindu groups. This concession to the economically, socially and politically dominating high caste Hindu population is mentioned in the preliminary part of the constitution above all other fundamental rights. What does it mean for example that article 11 guarantees the equality of all citizens, if the state has before been declared as a Hindu state? This means that not only the religion, but also Hindu social order, Hindu values, Hindu ways of thinking and living, and Hindu politics with all their effects are binding for state and society.

Article 6 of the constitution can be seen in a similar way. It defines Nepali, the mother tongue of the centrally dominating Hindu society, as language of the nation and official language (rastra bhasa and sarkari kamkajko bhasa). All other mother tongues of the country are named "national languages" (rastriya bhasa). They shall be preserved and promoted by the government (article 26), even though little has been done so far. This language policy gives the speakers of national languages hardly any chance in competition with those, who have Nepali as their mother tongue, and discriminates them in politics, administration and society.

The current executive and legislative system is very similar to that of western democracies. The king is only formally sharing power. The legislative consists of a bicameral parliament, the house of representatives (pratinidhi sabha) with 205 members directly elected by the people and the national assembly (rastriya sabha) with 60 members. The king is required to appoint the leader of the strongest party in the house of representatives as Prime Minister. The other ministers are to be appointed by the king on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The thus constituted council of ministers is responsible not to the king but to the house of representatives.

Part 17 of the constitution (articles 112-114) sets fundamental rules for the formation and recognition of political parties that had been banned for so many years. The parties are required to organize themselves along democratic rules, to have their office bearers elected at least once every five years and to have at least five percent female candidates for elections to the house of representatives. Article 113 (3) gives the election commission the right to bar parties from elections, which are formed on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or region:

The Election Commission shall not register any political organisation or party if any Nepali citizen is discriminated against in becoming a member on the basis of religion, caste, tribe, language or sex or if the name, objectives, insignia or flag is of such a nature that it is religious, communal or tends to fragment the country.

The Nepali state has used this very interpretative article several times to control non-Hindu parties and organizations. In 1991 the Election Commission withheld the recognition of three parties representing ethnic or other social groups that were discriminated against by the Hindu state. For the mid-term elections of November 1994 this number grew to six (Gorkhapatra 06.08.1994). Critics say that this article 113 is nonsense, since the state is declared to be a Hindu state and so it is communal itself. In any case, the Election Commission only rejects those parties that confront the state communalism with ethnic communalism.

But irrespective of such shortcomings has the system change of 1990 provided the conditions required for the development of civil society in Nepal. The political power has been transferred from the hands of the king to those of elected representatives of the people. Today the elected politicians and their political parties are responsible for the implementation of democracy and social changes. Within the first two years after the movement of 1990 three parties came to the limelight, while the other parties more and more lost importance and influence. Those three leading parties were the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), which had been formed in early 1991 by the unification of two splinter groups of the former Nepal Communist Party, and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party or National Democratic Party (NDP), the party of the erstwhile panchas, the politicians of the partyless panchayat system.

Election behaviour of the people


The constitution of 1990 has laid sovereignty into the hands of the people. The people have the chance to take influence upon the political, economic and social state formation and development by general and free elections, and they can control the elected representatives of the parties. Since 1990 the people could make use of this right twice each in parliamentary and local elections. The participation in the elections of over 60 % may be proof enough that the people are willing to play their political part. With the exception of the local elections of 1997 all elections can be called peaceful. Disturbances did not arise from the people but mainly from representatives of the political parties, and no party can acquit itself of guilt.

But even more impressive is the way the people have voted. Let us first have a look at the parliamentary elections. In 1991 the people clearly voted in favour of the old traditional party of the Nepali Congress. It seems that the reason for this was not only the important role the party had played during the democracy movement of 1990 but also the memory of the glorious past of the NC: The people gave their vote for the same party that had been expelled from power by King Mahendra's coup d’état in 1960. In this context, it may be characteristic that irrespective of the many undemocratic features of the constitution of 1959 the NC of the 1990s always spoke of the restoration of democracy and not of its introduction. So in the eyes of many people the restoration of democracy was identical with the restoration of the political power of the Nepali Congress.

But the elections of 1991 had also some other aspects of fundamental importance. The developments of 1990 had produced great a number of parties, 20 of which took part in the first parliamentary elections. Contrary to expectations, the people with their clear vote avoided a stalemate in parliament. With the exception of very few parties, all the minor ones were totally ignored. This trend continued in 1994, when only five parties were able to win seats in parliament.

Another important feature of the 1991 elections was the crushing defeat of those forces that had "represented" the people under the panchayat system. This defeat of the then two Rastriya Prajatantra Parties, which together only won four out of 205 seats, led to their unification in the aftermath of the elections. In 1994 this conservative party obviously had recovered winning 20 seats and becoming the third party-political force. This improvement of the RPP was not only caused by its new unity but also by the peoples dissatisfaction with three and a half years of NC government.

And finally we have to mention the election of the CPN-UML as main opposition party in 1991 and then as strongest party in 1994. Abroad, there has been lack of understanding for this election behaviour of the people at a time of world-wide decline of communist systems. Parts of the western press even wrote about political immaturity of the Nepali people. But there have been several reasons why the people thought it necessary to vote for this party. First, the CPN-UML has deviated from the traditional ideology of communist parties since its foundation. The party declares its support to constitutional monarchy, the multiparty system, parliamentarianism and even a free market economy on the basis of the constitution of 1990. Compared to other parties world-wide, the CPN-UML is more a social-democratic than a communist party, but it sticks to its name because of its historical development. Thus the party fulfils a function, which at the times of B. P. Koirala had been that of the NC, while the NC of the 1990s in many aspects has become a party even right of the centre.

Role of political parties in democratic Nepal


In a society characterized by poverty and socio-religious inequalities the people are looking for a kind of political representation that opens up perspectives and hopes changing their fate. The masses in general had been deeply disappointed by the NC, and so they elected the party out of government in 1994. The NC is not only suffering from a distinct turn to the right, but it is also shaken by deep rooted interior problems. The few remaining personalities of the first hour – Girija Prasad Koirala, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and Ganesh Man Singh who died in 1997 – have been fighting each other publicly punching below the belt since the elections of 1991, when the then interim Prime Minister Bhattarai was not elected and had to give way for Koirala. Singh finally even left the party, Bhattarai handed over the NC presidency to Koirala and the latter facing a possible split of the party laid the leading role in parliament into the hands of a younger generation. But also the experiment to make Sher Bahadur Deuba the party leader for the years to come poorly failed. The one and a half years of his coalition government based on a majority of only one vote, overshadowed by corruption, nepotism and abuse of authority, led to the absolute low for the young Nepali democracy.

All political parties are facing problems with implementing intra-party democracy. Confining our view to the three leading parties we see that NC and RPP elect their presidents in a democratic manor, but then endow them with enormous power. The persons responsible for the ideological line of the party, like the members of the central working committees, are not elected but nominated by the party president on his own decision. Bhattarai even delayed these nominations for many months at a time of greatest conflict within the party. Only within the CPN-UML the central committee is directly elected by the national congress, towards which it is responsible. The undemocratic structure of the leading parties makes the introduction of a broad based and equal participation of all strata of society even more difficult. Only the established party elites, which in all parties belong to the Brahmans and Chetris, decide, if other groups of society are allowed to participate or not, for example when election candidates have to be nominated. This is for the disadvantage of those groups that already had been disadvantaged before the advent of democracy: the ethnic groups, the so-called untouchables, the women and the Tarai population.

With greater parts of the people still having no positive perspectives, the leading parties steadily lose control. One of the best symbols is the fate of the NC. Being the strongest party in Parliament in 1991 with an absolute majority of seats and winning the local elections of 1992 with about 60 % of the votes, the party has been falling into an abyss. In November 1994 the NC lost its majority in parliament and in May 1997 it was swept out of the local bodies securing only 30 % of the votes. An end is not to be seen. The split of the CPN-UML in March 1998 again has made the NC the strongest party in parliament. Girija Prasad Koirala became prime minister for a second time, first as head of a NC minority government, then as leader of a coalition with the CPN-ML, the splinter group of the CPN-UML, and finally as prime minister of a coalition of NC, CPN-UML and Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP). As the 1999 general elections approach, Koirala has even presented his party rival Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, who so far has lost three elections, as the coming prime minister of Nepal. One will have to see if this brings more unity into the Nepali Congress. Younger leaders have already shown signs of disappointment.

The conservative forces represented by the RPP have been in an upward trend since the local elections of 1992, irrespective of its participation in the Deuba government, for whose failure the RPP had been especially responsible. But like the NC, the RPP, too, is split into two camps headed by Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Surya Bahadur Thapa respectively. Both of them led coalition governments in 1997/98. First Chand was prime minister of the absurd coalition government of RPP and CPN-UML forced by the NCP-UML rebel Bam Dev Gautam. After half a year, this coalition was brought down on the intention of Chand’s party colleague and president, Surya Bahadur Thapa, who then headed a coalition government of RPP, NC and NSP. This government was again brought down, when Chand split his party forming the New RPP in early 1998.

The main beneficiary of the negative trend of the NC has been the CPN-UML. Several reasons can be mentioned in this context. Nepal's masses are living in great poverty. It was under the first government of Girija Prasad Koirala that the people recognised, that the NC is no longer a party representing the interests of the poverty stricken and backward strata of society. This position became more and more filled by the CPN-UML whose ideology is concentrated on the hardships of the poor. This has already been decisive for the party's success in the parliamentary elections of 1994. The minority government of Man Mohan Adhikari, which lasted for only nine months, initiated such great a number of populist measures in advantage of the rural masses, that the NC saw no other chance but to overthrow the government, if it did not want to loose possible mid-term elections. Even the later irrational coalition of the CPN-UML with the rightist RPP did not bring any harm to the party in the eyes of the people, as the great success in the local elections of 1997 has shown.

But the politics of the CPN-UML, too, became more and more guided by power ambitions. One prove may have been the coalition with the RPP accepting a former pancha as Prime Minister. Another evidence is the intra-party struggle and later split of the party initiated by Bam Dev Gautam. For sure, the party still has internal problems with the integration of radical communist forces into a more and more social-democratic party conception. So, similar to the NC and the RPP the CPN-UML is suffering from internal tensions, conflicts and power struggles. Such insufficiencies of the leading parties are increasingly provoking activities of radical extra-parliamentary forces. The best example may be the so-called people's war (jana yuddha) of the Maoists with its growing effectiveness in recent times.

Extra-parliamentary extremism


For about three years, the hill-area of middle and later also of eastern Nepal is hit by some kind of revolution that is shaking the foundations of state and society. This war is organized by extremist communist forces calling themselves NCP (Maoist). After the democracy movement of 1990, some extremist splinter groups of the erstwhile NCP joined under the name NCP (Unity Centre). They formed the Samyukta Jana Morcha Nepal (United People’s Front Nepal) as their political wing, which participated in the 1991 elections winning nine seats and becoming the third strongest party in parliament. The split of the Unity Centre in 1993 was also the end of the SJMN as a parliamentarian force. One of the splinter groups was that of Kamal Pushpa Dahal, better known as Comrade Prachand. It called itself NCP (Maoist).

Its highly talented ideologist, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, calls his party’s activities a people's war, with the aims of fundamentally changing the economic and social structure of the country and introducing a new kind of democracy. The Nepali state represented by the political parties, on the other hand, is speaking about terrorist activities, which have to be opposed forcefully by the state.

The SJMN had already called the people's movement of 1990 an unfinished revolution. In order to bring this revolution to an end, the SJMN had tried to use the parliament as an operation level under the disrespected constitution of 1990. Its then convenor, Baburam Bhattarai, saw no sense for the extension of this kind of politics after the collapse of the Koirala government. In his eyes there was not much ideological and structural difference between the established parliamentary parties. After the split of the SJMN, Bhattarai tried hard for a common line of the Maoist forces. At least after the downfall of the Adhikari government in autumn 1995 and the installation of the coalition government of the NC with the conservative RPP, these extreme left forces found the time ripe for revolution. So in February 1996 the Maoists started their people's war in some districts of mid-western Nepal, especially in Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, and Salyan, partly also in Gorkha.

Baburam Bhattarai calls the people's war an epoch-making event in Nepali history. For the first time, the Nepali people had woken up from a deep slumber of semi-colonial and semi-feudal oppression and exploitation. Even individuals with little political consciousness would see the current deep political crisis of the state. As reason Bhattarai mentions Nepal's semi-colonial integration into British India by the treaty of Sugauli (1816) and the continuation of this status by the Indo-Nepali Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. The slavish acquiescences of the feudal ruling classes to foreign powers would have distorted the independent socio-economic and political development process. A small coterie of feudal comprador and bureaucratic capitalist classes comprising about 5% of the population would have been monopolizing power and resources and exercising hegemony over 95% of the people. This had given rise to intense class, national and regional contradictions. As a result the country would now have slumped to the ignominious status of being the second poorest country in the world. So, Bhattarai thinks that it is necessary to overthrow the state with its rotten socio-economic structure and to make a revolutionary transformation on a new democratic basis. (Spotlight, March 21 1997, p. 22)

The Maoists first started their actions according to classical revolutionary methods: identification of the above mentioned so-called negative state forces and deliberate attacks upon the life and property of these persons. As a result, the law and order situation in the affected areas deteriorated seriously. In spring 1997 the Maoists used the local elections to intensify their actions. In some parts of the country elections could not be held at all, in others they were hindered considerably. The revolutionary forces demonstrated impressively, that their activities were no longer a passing fancy of crazy left revolutionaries, but a socio-political process that needed to be taken seriously.

The governments since then have not shown much interest in the political arguments of the Maoists. According to government declarations they are terrorists that must be met by nothing else but repression. So the Deuba government concentrated police forces in the affected districts. Operating in the same way as in panchayat times they killed great a number of people by shooting. Time and again, the people have heavily complained about the arbitrary measures of the police. In fact, many more people have been killed or hurt by the police than by the Maoist actions. Torture and other human rights violations in police custom as well as arbitrary killing are often reported events.

Baburam Bhattarai denies to be a terrorist. The capitalist and imperialist nations idolizing the USA would only regard themselves as democratic. All people opposed to their world order would be called terrorists. So Bhattarai calls the Maoist people's war a counter-terrorism against the imperialist global terrorism. (Spotlight March 21, 1997, p. 23)

The Nepali state has problems offering a political dialogue. Even after three years of Maoist activities, the government explains not to know the reasons for the people's war, because it cannot admit that many of Baburam Bhattarai's arguments are true. Official statistics as well as anthropological and historical research verify Bhattarai's statements concerning the distribution of wealth and power in the kingdom. And a glance at the ethnicity of ministers, party politicians, parliamentarians, leading government officials and entrepreneurs makes clear that the movement of 1990 has not been a revolution by its name. Only persons have been exchanged, and even this has often been revised today. Those forces that guaranteed the feudal conservative system of society until 1990 have been sitting at the cabinet table several times since autumn 1995, and for short, they even held the office of Prime Minister. Corruption, nepotism and abuse of authority, once called the fundamental evils of the panchayat system, are practised today in public by members of the same elite circles that have feathered their nest at the expense of the masses for the past 200 years.

For the latter, the democratization has not brought any improvement, neither economically nor in respect of socio-political participation. If the leaders of the main political parties, who are now responsible for the fate of the country, really wanted to change this situation, they would have to rob themselves of their own privileges. While changing the government they can woo needed coalition partners by powerful positions laden with chances for corrupt practices. But how shall the same politicians negotiate with people who have nothing to offer but their poverty and their exploited and underprivileged status? How shall they explain to these people the whereabouts of millions of international money that every year disappear in dubious channels? How to make the masses understand that they have to be deprived of fundamental education, because else their growing political awareness would endanger the privileges of the ruling elite? A dialogue with the rebellious left forces has not been possible so far, because the party politicians are neither able nor willing to answer such questions.

But besides such objections against the government one also has to ask, if the Maoists offer some kind of alternative to the current system. Their leader, Baburam Bhattarai, may side with the poor masses, but accidentally or not, he and the other Maoist leaders, too, belong to the privileged elite of the Bahuns. Bhattarai mentions three main causes for the social, economic and political inequalities: Nepal's inclusion into the sphere of British colonialism, the extension of this dependency in form of modern India, and the submissive cooperation of Nepal's ruling feudal elite with these foreign powers. But Bhattarai does not mention that the real causes for the above cited inequalities are much older. They go back to the time of Nepali unification (1743-1816), when the Gorkha rulers applied their Hindu-political and social ideals upon the conquered territories. The legal formation and fixation of this order was a domestic process with no influence by British colonialism.

The impoverishment of the greater parts of the population have been caused by this application of Hindu-political principles. Affected were all those persons, who, according to the thinking of the high caste elite, were inferior creatures, because they belonged to ethnic groups or were so-called untouchables. Strikingly, Baburam Bhattarai does not mention these fundamental causes of inequality. He is talking about colonialism and imperialism of leading western nations like the USA, but he is silent about the colonialism and imperialism of communist or former communist states, like China and the Soviet Union, against the numerous national minorities within their own countries. Both communism and democracy are western ideologies developed to fight class differences. Religious, cultural and ethnic inequalities had only minor importance in 19th and early 20th century Europe. But in Nepal they are decisive. So it remains doubtful if the Maoist ideology provides a way for social changes. But one thing is sure: For the present they offer the poor masses hopes the government and the established parties are not able or willing to provide.

Monarchy, Hindu fundamentalism, and ethnicity


The introduction of democracy and the process of its development has also influenced a number of extra-party groups. First to mention are the conservative forces with the monarch as their personified symbol. In the course of the 1990 movement and its aftermath, King Birendra had to give up his absolute rights step by step. The political parties involved in drafting the new constitution treated the king with respect and so made it easier for him to renounce his former absolute rights, even though the palace on several occasions tried to keep as much power as possible. The greatest concession of the party politicians was the definition of the state as a constitutional monarchical Hindu state. This was a guarantee for the continuation of the Shah dynasty and it elevated its socio-political foundation, the Hindu religion, culture and society, against the other numerous cultures and societies of the multiethnic state Nepal.

In 1990 the constitution drafting commission had asked the people to submit suggestions for the new constitution. According to Vishvanath Upadhyaya, the chairman of the commission, 95% of these suggestions concerned religion, language and culture. Upadhyaya, who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and who himself was a Bahun like most of the members of the drafting commission, called these things totally unimportant for the formulation of a democratic constitution. Representatives of the Nepali Congress in the commission insisted upon the continuation of the Hindu state, as it had been demanded by the traditional feudal elites, the palace, the former panchas and the leading Bahuns. The commission rejected the idea of a secular state, which the left parties and the organizations of ethnic groups, low Hindu casts and women had been fighting for.

The corresponding heated discussion in the political parties subsided soon after the promulgation of the constitution. The king has put up with his new constitutional monarchical role, and the leading parties soon forgot their public commitment to equality and participation of all citizens. At least at the national level, the parties are still dominated by members of high Hindu castes; members of ethnic groups have only chances in their main living areas. All political parties have problems with the constitutional regulation, that at least 5% of the election candidates must be women. And very often, these female candidates are set-up in constituencies where they hardly have any chance to win. As a consequence, only seven of the 205 members of the House of Representatives (3.4%) are women. All this must be seen in context with the socio-political conceptions of the Hindu state.

The continuation of the Hindu state has been the highest maxim of both the conservative forces and the leading party politicians of democratic Nepal, because this alone guarantees their elite privileges. Secularism has always been identified with the lifting of the ban of missionary practices. There are talks of the decline of Hinduism, its eradication by Christian missionaries and finally the expulsion of Hindus from Nepal. Taking the mean practices of some of the numerous Christian aid organizations working in the Country for common, there are never ending talks of thousands of conversions to Christianity day by day.

But the discussion of dangerous Christian missionary distracts from the negative attitudes of the Hindu state for the many indigenous cultures. In support of the Hindu state-religion the king and the politicians are courting Hindu dignitaries and sponsoring Hindu organizations and events. One never hears any word about the danger of Christian missionary for the ethnic cultures, the Buddhists and the Muslims, not to talk about the danger of state Hinduism for these religions and cultures.

Summary: Democracy and civil society


The one-sided cultural and religious politics of the Nepali state has led to the neglect of great parts of the population. According to the national census of 1991, 42% of the population belong to ethnic groups, some of which have become superficially Hinduized. Another 22% are Hindus belonging to so-called untouchable castes. Both groups take no advantages from the socio-political order and distribution of power in a Hindu state. If we also include the 3-4% Muslims mentioned by the census into this number game, the number of beneficiaries of the Hindu state, i.e. the high Hindu castes, is reduced to little more than 30% of the population. This number has to be halved again, since the women, according to Hindu laws, have no economic rights and so can only participate in state and society with the allowance of their fathers or husbands.

So Nepal currently is in a dilemma. On the one hand has democracy entered the country at the beginning of the 1990s, and the parties have played a decisive part in this development; on the other hand is this democratization unfinished. Of course, democracy cannot come over night, but Nepal's special problem is, that there has been no socio-political change and no political will to participate the population as a whole. The people have the right and liberty to elect their representatives for the different state levels and, by this way, to influence the political development of the country. But the selection of who is eligible, is still in the hands of members of the same elites, which had once been sharing power in the feudal royal state and which are now dominating the political parties. The poor masses remain excluded and have hardly any chance to save their interests through the current parliamentary system. This provides a fertile soil for extra-parliamentary forces calling for the boycott of elections and instigating a revolution.

A compromise is offered by some organizations of disadvantaged groups like those of ethnic groups, low Hindu castes and women. These organizations today have partly joined to federations in order to have a stronger voice in the discussions with the state. With growing intensity, they are trying to inform their respective population groups about their civil rights, and they provide them with what officially should be the task of state and politicians: political consciousness, self-esteem and legal advise in their struggle for political and economic rights.

Like executive and legislative, the judiciary as well is dominated by the traditional elite. During the past years the justices of the Supreme Court had to decide a number of complaints about infringement of the constitution charged by members of disadvantaged groups. They rarely took the heart to force the lawgiver to legal amendments shaking the foundations of the traditional system. Parties representing non-Hindu communities, for example, found no recognition as political parties, while the Nepal Sadbhavana Party, representing the India based Hindu population of the Tarai, had no such problems. Other examples are the numerous suits of women against their legal discrimination. So far, the Supreme Court has not ordered parliament to implement the constitutional principle of legal equality irrespective of race, caste, gender, etc.

It is a common feature, that such measures aiming at fundamental social changes are not initiated by political parties. The latter have prepared the way for democracy, but they withdraw from its implementation and instead turn to corruption and internal power struggle. In interest of Nepal's future one can only hope for new democratic leaders, who are willing to enforce the socio-political, participatory and economic changes necessary for the development of civil society, before radical and anarchic forces are able to take the lead.

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Tamang, Parshuram. 1997 [2054 v.s.]. Janajati ra rastravad (kehi lekhaharusangalo). [Nationalities and nationalism (a collection of works)]. Kathmandu: Jana Sahitya Prakashan Kendra.

Uprety, Prem R. 1992. Political Awakening in Nepal: The Search for a New Identity. New Delhi: Commonwealth.


Nepal's ties with the Western world goes beyond the British rule. When Greeks began contacts with the Scythia. Aristotle's teachings and its symbiosis with eastern world resulted in the founding of a new peaceful religion, Buddhism in the East (ref. Ancient Greece book I read in Chicago). The opening of the Silk Road resulted in long established contacts with China and Greek colonies and Greece proper. The greater proportion of Indo-European people and India originate from Central Asia ref wikipedia). The contacts with Ionian Greeks (Yavanas) and Scythians is well established in Hindu scriptures including the Mahabharata (ibid.) It is obnoxious and deceitful to blame the Ranas for supporting the East India Company as the company represented order and a positive force with great contribution to the development of the subcontinent. Great personalities of the company like Robert Clive have important role in Indian subcontinent's overall development. Nepal's ties with West goes back to the missionaries from Rome who came to study Buddhism in Tibet and northern Nepal. Newar Malla kings were the first to welcome and embrace them. The Presidency of Bengal sent a company of troops to support King Jaya Prakash Malla when his kingdom was threatened by Gorkha king Prithvi Narayan Shah. Nepal's incursion in Tibet following the silver currency dispute with Tibet resulted in Sino-Nepal war of 1792-93. Nepal's contacts with East India company, its trade relations and diplomatic support were crucial in helping Nepal stand the might of China's main forces in Dhaibung, Rasuwa district. Without muskets and manportable cannons, the Gurkha Royal Army had no chance against the Chinese army of emperor Chien Lung. The army was lead by Chien Lung's son in law. After mutual court intrigue of the Thapas and Pandes which resulted in imprisonment and death of important Nepali prime minister Bhimsen Thapa, Nepali court politics became extremely volatile. At that time Bir Narsingh Kunwar, an ordinary soldier ala Napoleon seized control of power. His alliance with the East India Company was important for the soveriegnty of Nepal as an independent and free state. After solidifying his power base, he headed on a tour of Europe to learn of the Industrial Revolution, Renaissance and other vante garde ideas prevalent in Europe. He brought reforms like building of postal roads. He introduced heliography (ref. Seto Bagh, Diamond Shumsher Rana) a technology of communications which helped rapid transformation of information. In pre-telegraph Nepal, such technology helped save lives of people. Jang Bahadur Rana with his tacit support of the East India Company won back Butwal and Syuraj into Nepal. This is in sharp contrast to the present chaotic turbulence and unrest. His visit to England, the greatest power of that time expanded Nepal's diplomatic ties with Europe. British prime Ministers like Disraeli learned from Nepal's experience as a tumultous state. These experiences may have influenced Lord Balfour to declare a separate and vibrant state for the Jews in Plaestine. (excuse me, this is my enthymeme). But his attempts to reform the social structure met with odds of the Brahmin elite, resulting in Nepal's general backwardness and its slow growth. Therefore, I strongly disagree that Ranas were usurpers. The Ranas were first to introduce schools and colleges in Nepal. Gen. Nara Shumsher introduced sports in Nepal. As a result of Ranas contribution in the development of Nepal, United Kingdom government recognized Nepal in 1923, much before India. The Rana led government allowed and facilitated the recruitment of hill peasants into the British Army, which began after the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-16). These people with no other opportunity in the hills became economically independent and cosmopolitan through their foreign travel and education opportunities for their children. Otherwise, the traditional Hindu castes, especially the Brahmins who dominate Nepal's education, civil service, political parties and media, would have had total control over elite postions of Nepal.

The handing over of power to the masses through 1979 referendum, 1990 people's movement and 1996 pro-Maoist loktantric movement has resulted in a violent political culture in Nepal. The so-called people's war initiated by Maoists and supported by the left has resulted in physical destruction of millions of dollars worth of investment in infrastructure, primarily of aid money. Tourists are being scared with extortion and double taxation.

The veering to republic has served to alienate different ethnic groups to lose their sense of identity. Platonic rule of Kings of the Shah dynasty and Rana prime ministers had been giving a uniting spirit to the nation state. The application of blatant Marxism-Leninism into an agrarian society has resulted in protracted violence. Tens of thousands have left the country in search of foreign employment. According to Nepal Rastra Bank (the Federal Reserve Board of Nepal), the country earns nearly one billion dollars in foreign exchange. The money is being primarily spent in consumption. Nepal needs to invite foreign oil firms to explore petroleum deposits in Eastern Nepal. The companies ought to be encouraged to stay. They should be assured that their investment would be returned. Jobs would be created and the oil revenue can be used to develop more smaller and medium level hydro-electic projects. The energy can be exported to India.

The multitude of so called political parties which are de-facto armed groups creates new challenges to liberal democracy (ref. Insurgency and Terrorism, Bard O'Neill, presented to me by noted American scholar Dr. Thomas A. Marks). Armed coercion of electorates and appeals to populism deviates the goal toward real democracy. It creates illiberal democracy, according to Newsweek International editor Fareed Zakaria.

The poor electorates of Nepal have been duped by adherents of traditional Marxism-Leninism. It was antediluvian for Nepal to seek socialism in 1990 when the Iron Curtain fell in Eastern Europe. Communism is not the answer to Nepal's status as one of the poorest and least developed economies. Communists invited civil war into Nepal and squarely blamed the bloodshed on the King and the army. His Majesty the King after the unfortunate incident of 2001 only tried to restore order in the country. His slogan to make Nepal a transit center of South Asia between India and China is laudatory.

Dr. Baburam Bhattarai's armed outfit has threatened to ally itself with Al Qaida to respond to any attempt by the US government to intervene in Nepal. By allying itself with this murderous outfit which organized the infamous 9/11 attacks, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Prachanda and so-called military leader "Badal" have to bear responsibility for the murder of ten thousand plus Nepali lives. They must be dragged to the International Criminal Court to stand trial. Badal's education in communist Russia and purportedly his training in once pariah state Libya, a known sponsor of terrorism e.g. the Lockerbie bombings and aggression in Chad, proves he is a known Carlos the Jackal wanna be of Nepal. This character deserves the worst punishment for teaching young children to build bombs. The exploitation of rural indigenous women into cannon fodders by the so-called communist rebels have completely depleted precious human resorces. These people could have been farm hands or industral labor instead of rifle toting lemmings.

Citing elite theory, the rise of neo-elites, primarily the Brahmins has brought Nepal into a new age of fatality and warfare. Rana regime may have been restrictive but it was in many ways scientific. The population of Kathmandu, the capital city, was carefully controlled. Pilgrims from India were asked to leave after the end of religious festivals. The present overpopulation of Kathmandu from rural residents is a sign that post 1950 planners have completely failed to plan cities. Centralized development ala Paris has resulted in woefully mismanaged infrastructure.

The talk of colonialism and imperialism by Dr Baburam Bhattarai is nonsense. But he needs to remember that foreign investment is key to Nepal's sustainable development. The dismantling of Hindu social structure sought by the communists has a serious danger of igniting ethnic tensions like that of Southeastern Europe-Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The rise of RPP denotes that conservatism is a force to be reckoned with. Traditionalists and anti-communists can again unite and defeat the forces of Marxism-Leninism and its destructive socio-economic practices. Marxism has brought turmoil throughout the Third World. In Cuba, Fidel Castro the dictator came to power promising salvation to Cuba's poor. Considered the leader of world communists, this miserable character ordered the death of his most loyal soldier, Gen. Ochoa Sanchez on trumped up drug smuggling charge. He had him arrested for he feared the future of his regime. The number two man in Cuba right now is Fidel's brother, Raul. What an example of family rule and an anathema to meritocracy. And, this dictator Fidel has $90 million in his bank account, says Forbes magazine. If Nepal follows the road of Che Guevera and Fidel Castro, Nepal is on its way to become the next gulag archipelago of South Asia. Now do we need another failed state?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright © 1999, Karl-Heinz Krämer

Rav Kook

Master of Halacha.

emunah=belief
ahavah=love

He refused to reject Jews as long as they identified themselves as Jews.

Fully capable of rejecting, but since there were enough rejecters, he was fulfilling the role of the embracer.

"Ours is a wonderful generation. In all of Jewish history it is difficult to find its equal. It consists of opposites, darkness and light exist in confusion. On one hand, mischievous and wild, on the other hand exalted and refined; on the one hand arrogant and shameless and, on the other hand, overwhelmed with a passion for justice and mercy. Its preoccupation with both facts and ideals bursts forth and ascends to Heaven."

Copyright: Pioneers of Israel, Phil Blazer and Shelley Portnoy, Blazer Publications.

Encomia to Zippora

Zippora, Zippora ich liebe dich
you are our eucalyptus tree

you are gay, wise
pls cool me like ice

When I take a bath,
I think of your wrath,

Oh my guiding light,
show me your right,

Tell me your story,
So we all can see glory.

Composed by Pritam, top line on his way to West Pico, Los Angeles, August 14, 2008.

Nicomachean ethics

Ethica Nicomachea

Inscription at Delos:-

"Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health; But pleasantest is it to win what we love."

Aristotle II, Nicomachean ethics, Book I, credited to Los Angeles Public Library, Van Nuys branch, August 15, 2008.

Xenocrates, teacher of Hephastion, Alexander's senior general, taught Scythians, our ancestors -- "happiness comes from virtue."

Source:-Wikipedia.org

Red Eagle over Caucasus

-Pritam S Rana
The brutal Russian attack in Georgia reminds of Stalin's times, purges of Kulaks and neighbors. When Finland was nearly sapped by the Stalinists in 1939, Churchill offered help. President Coolidge sent Marines to overturn the Reds. But Leninism was too strong in the pre-roaring twenties America. His efforts to help Wrangel's legions completely failed.

The present war is also oil driven. Gazprom's insatiable appetite for oil monopoly in the Caspian is one of the reasons Putin is encouraging South Ossetians to rise up against Georgia. Gazprom wants to monopolize supply for the 'black gold' to Europe. A clear message to Poland too, says LA Times. Putin wants to blackmail Poland to stay away from US sponsored missile shield program in Central Europe. Moscow knows the program is Iran oriented. But Putin wants to back Iranian nuclear program in a bid to strengthen itself in the new cold war. Moscow as a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and wants to tell its neighbors that it means business. Georgian withdrawal from Iraq (ref, LA times and ABC7) facilitates Iran's growing influence in Iraq. Obama's withdrawal plans would further push Iraq toward SCO circle. US and Western investment in Iraq is in jeopardy once the Shanghai pact seizes initiative there.

Europe on the other hand seems slow to react to Russian aggression. Germany, as a leader of Europe, should squarely condemn Russia for its reckless intervention. The Jewish population is already being evacuated, says Jerusalem Post. Additional wave of refugees is likely to cause infaltionary pressure and rising unemployment is already a problem in slowing economies of the US, Germany and Israel.

Russian leader Putin turned out to be a true Stalinist. Disrespecting Georgia's historic independence and the right to self determination, the current bloodshed inflicted by Russia is highly deplorable. LA Times quotes an unnamed US diplomat as saying Russian military is using heavy bombers and ground forces to inflict massive civilian casualties, punitive measures designed to scare President Saakashvili's pro-Western government out of power. Moscow favors quick regime change ala Chechnya. But Georgia is a Christian country and not some backwater like Chechnya. Putin should remember that many Georgian nationalists fought against the Red Army in the Eastern Front (1941-45). Moscow cannot take this present affair as a cakewalk.

Led by platonic leaders such as Prince Kakutsa Cholokashvili (ref. wikipedia.org) in the early 20th century, Russia under the spell of Bolshevism sent Red Army to crush Georgian independence just after the end of World War I. Moscow installed Fillipp Makharadze, a stooge of Red Russia, as the new dictator. In a long episode of domination and oppression, Georgian civilians were massacred by Russian Army in 1989, when the whole world was witnessing freedom from oppression. Russia's entry into Georgia's internal affairs in August this year and its attempt to divide free-spirited Georgians is a very negative development. Sharing a culture of Ionian Greeks, Georgia deserves to be independent and sovereign. Its links to the West cannot be subjugated by force majeure.

Although Western aid has been forthcoming, Georgia remains underdeveloped, ranking 2.8 in Corruption Perception Index. Once peace returns, the wonderful tourist area can attract Western visitors who can enjoy the wilderness and its unique culture, a blend of Caucasian and Greek.

The United States, Germany, the UK, France and Israel should provide security assistance to Georgia. Although a NATO partner, Georgia has received meager assistance for its security. Only about a hundred foreign security experts are in Georgia, according to Wikipedia. As Europeans, Georgia deserves aid and assistance. Viva Georgia!

THE END

US slogs through Iraqi quagmire

By PRITAM S RANA

Ever since the US president decided to topple Saddam Hussein using military force, Iraq has become a huge mess. The recent decision by President Bush to change the leadership of US commanders in the region will also yield little positive result if the same policy is pursued to control the insurgency and keep Iraq intact.

In 2003, US president Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair agreed to mount military operation to topple Saddam Hussein, who was increasingly defying US pressure. The US and allied military analysts calculated that Saddam's potential stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons could be lethal if they were provided to Al Qaida. Although lacking evidence linking Al Qaida with the Saddam regime, the US planners decided to go against Iraq despite outright opposition from many European and other countries. The decision proved costly.

Although the US and British forces quickly defeated Saddam's defenders who were greatly weakened by years of sanctions, they were faced by a brutal insurgency by Iraqis who were either Saddam loyalists, Sunnis and Shiite paramilitaries. As the US attempted to set up a democratic political system in a country long ruled by an iron-fisted dictator, the much oppressed Shiites emerged as the majority ethnic group. The shift in political power from Sunni-dominated Saddam regime to Shiites was widely resented among the Sunni community, which constituted the second largest ethnic group. Fearing dominance by Shiites, Sunnis launched a brutal insurgency, which was also backed by Al Qaida led but now deceased Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The third major ethnic group, the Kurds were Washington's allies against Saddam regime. They were already in a tussle with Sunnis over control of major oilfields in northern Iraq.

Iraq's three major ethnic groups were kept in a tight grip under Saddam's totalitarian rule. Once Saddam was gone, the communities began to reassert their roles and soon found themselves at each other's throats. Today there are Sunni and Shiite paramilitaries killing each other. Besides attacking US troops, bomb blasts, mortar attacks, drive-by shootings occur almost everyday in Baghdad and other cities. The life of ordinary Iraqis have been reduced to a hell with possibly hundreds of thousands of Iraqis already dead since 2003.

So, what is Washington's goal in Iraq? It can be said that initially in 2003, the US administration thought of getting rid of Saddam first. He was thought to be a too dangerous old enemy in post 9/11 world, a regional threat and possible Al Qaida partner. President Bush might also have thought that he could democratize Iraq after Saddam was flushed out. A new democratic Iraq, a partner in the Global War on Terror, could possibly be an example in the whole Middle East. Leftists and anti-US theorists have always argued that Iraq's oil wealth was great motivating factor for Washington's invasion of Iraq. They have said that the US wanted lucrative oil and rebuilding contracts including the entry of US multinationals into Iraq.

The US troops in Iraq are widely resented as occupiers by ordinary Iraqis. The insurgents seek to create maximum US casualties in order to force it leave Iraq. It was reported that President Bush has decided to replace top US commander in Iraq and also the theater commander who oversees the war in Afghanistan. The previous commanders are said to have favored US troop cuts which is also being demanded by the new Democrat majority Congress in the US. Appointing new commanders but pursuing same old policy may not help Washington. Besides, President Bush is said to favor increasing US troops in Iraq.

If the US leaves Iraq tomorrow, it is not at likely the killing would stop. In fact the US troops along with the fledgling Iraqi security forces are trying to curb sectarian violence. But past reports of Iraqi security men being involved in kidnapping and execution of rival ethnic groups is truly a disturbing sign. If Iraqis can't live together anymore, they may have to be divided permanently. Killings cannot continue in the name of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq. Three states, one each for the Shiites, Sunnis and the Kurds can be carved out. However, the fair distribution of natural resources including oil would be a mounting challenge for the three communities, which could fuel more conflict.

One of the lamest arguments in Iraq is the blame that the US was somehow responsible for the horrendous civilian casualties, which are being in fact perpetrated by Iraqi insurgents. Analysts have argued that Iraq was a powder keg from much early on. It is said that just like former Yugoslavia, which was at peace with itself only under iron-fisted rule of Tito, ethnic animosities in Iraq was only subdued under Saddam's total dictatorship. One way or another, if Saddam had been toppled from within, Iraq would have easily exploded into a full-fledged civil war.

Elsewhere, the US failure to capture Osama bin Laden and Mullah Mohammed Omar is also eroding US credibility. With titanic intelligence budget and resources, failure to hunt down these men has put a question mark on US and NATO military operations in Afghanistan. The US technological edge and its superiority in trained manpower have not been successful to capture these fugitives in the barren mountains of Afghan-Pakistan border. Once US warfighters get grid coordinates of possible bin Laden hideout, they are supposed to swoop down like eagles and take'em out much in the same fashion as Zarqawi was eliminated last year in Iraq. To the chagrin of US commanders, this has not happened yet.

The US, however, seemed more successful in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, acting as a US proxy, recently wiped out Islamist forces from Somalia aiding a secular government to take power. A purported Al Qaida video tape recently showed its no.2, Ayman al-Zaywairi, urging Muslims to pounce upon the Ethiopians. As the Ethiopian juggernaut rolled into Somalia driving away the Islamists, US Navy warships blocked sea routes to check the escape of Islamists by sea. Al Qaida wanted Somalia to become the "Mecca of the Mujahedeen", alas it has failed for now. But, Somalis resent Ethiopians and this resentment and the backing of Islamists by Ethiopia's northern neighbor Eritrea should be a cause of concern for the Bush administration and Adis Ababa.

Beginning from January 9, 2007, US Special Forces aviation units have conducted a series of airstrikes have hit several Somali villages thought to be hideouts of Al Qaida operatives. A prominent Al Qaida figure, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed was reportedly killed by a US helicopter raid in southern Somalia recently. The US Joint Task Force Horn of Africa based in Djibouti, a former French colony, is active to hunt down the likes of Mohammed, who the US authorities say was behind 1998 bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

The US is engaged in a global struggle with Islamists while on the other hand it is mired in domestic unrest involving massive violence in Iraq. While Washington may have moral high ground in its war against the merciless Islamists, its policies in Iraq will continue to receive criticism as the killings continue unabated.

China defying world by persecuting Tibetans

--Pritam S Rana

Reports by news agencies (and those posted on local news portals in Nepal – e.g. “e-kantipur”) outline unspeakable cruelty displayed by Chinese authorities against Tibetans attempting to escape flee China. Such acts of inhumanity cannot be permitted to pass.

According to reports, a group of about 70 Tibetan refugees including women, children and monks tried to cross into Nepal from the Tibet, on Saturday. Chinese soldiers having prior information of the flight “arrived with weapons and opened fire.” According to published reports, about 40 refugees managed to cross into Nepal while two were reportedly killed. Additionally, 2 others have gone “missing.”

While the world is focused on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, Sri Lanka and other hot spots, Tibet remains till this day, under a brutal occupation. The Chinese entered Tibet with military forces in 1950 and consolidated it after 1959.

China’s indifference towards the people of Tibet is reflected by Saturday’s tragic event. In stark contrast to universally accepted standards, Chinese soldiers chose to mow down fleeing and unarmed Tibetans for what was termed a ‘border violation’. Despite the modernity of their economic enterprise, the Chinese seem wed to the Stalinist dictum of keeping foreigners out and insiders within. The actions of China’s border troops show parallels with the attitudes of KGB (border guards).

China may think that its economic prowess and its capacity as the world’s largest market gives it the go ahead to suppress the Tibetan people. It is now an established fact that China has colonized Tibet with Han Chinese to such an extent that Tibetans are now a minority in their own homeland.

Tibetans are in such a sorry predicament that no country in the world (including the United Sates) is openly willing to challenge China on its Tibet policy. The US needs China’s vast market to sell its produce while other major European powers also do not want to antagonize China for fear of economic retaliation. China, as the largest holder of the US Treasury’s 30-year bond, exercises considerable leverage not just in bi-lateral regional trade, but truly in the smooth functioning of the entire global economy.

Owing to China’s increasing economic might, the cause for Tibetan freedom is now championed only by individuals and diminishing groups. They do not receive government support, for fear of antagonizing China. And despite the Tibetan spiritual leader (the Dalai Lama’s) heightened stature as a Nobel laureate, the cause he champions appears to be losing momentum.

China’s reaction towards the Dalai Lama has been harsh. Beijing puts pressure on foreign governments not to welcome the Dalai Lama in their countries. Such pressure is acutely felt in countries like Nepal which are forced to bow down to Beijing in the name of ‘peaceful coexistence.’

Beijing’s propaganda in tandem with the aid it provides to Nepal has been consistent over the years. The leftist and communists in Nepal have steadfastly backed China’s claim to Tibet. Nepal has held a long relationship with both China and India. Nepal was a trade partner and co-belligerents in different wars of the past. Nepal is one of the few countries besides India, which can trace the independence and sovereignty of Tibet in the past through a careful study of history. Despite China’s constant claim that Tibet was forever part of China, historical analysis reveals that Tibet was only an ally of China during its wars with Nepal. In fact, the China laid claim on Tibet after the Tibetans asked for Chinese military assistance during a war with Nepal. The Chinese simply decided never to leave.

It was a miserable decision by the former Nepali government to close the Tibetan contact offices in Nepal. Tibetan people are Nepal’s earliest neighbors. Many ethnic groups in Nepal (including the renowned Sherpas and Tamangs) are said to have migrated to Nepal from Tibet. Nepalis and Tibetans have fraternal relations that go as far back as the time of the Lichhavi King Amshuvarma who married his daughter Bhrikuti to the Tibetan King Srong Chong Gampo.

The Chinese on the other hand, came into contact with the Nepalis only after the Tibetans felt threatened by Nepal’s expansionist policies in the 18th century. Tibet sought military support from China, which brought them to Nepal’s border at that time.

It is commonly held misperception that the Tibetans and Chinese are one people or of the same stock. The language, script and culture stand wide apart when these two peoples are compared. The current existence of Tibetans as a Chinese minority is but a recent invention.

For a country like Nepal, it cannot allow Tibetan freedom fighters to operate from within its borders. In the past, Tibetan Khampas (supported by the CIA) had launched anti-Chinese operations from inside Nepal’s borders.

However, as is the case today (as it was then), Nepal’s geo-strategic position does not permit any actions that could potentially provoke China. But, this should not stop Nepal from providing moral support to the beleaguered Tibetans.

China has no right to ask Nepal not to allow such figures as Dalai Lama into the country. It also cannot ask Nepal not to accept Tibetan refugees, from entering Nepal.

There have been incidences of Nepali security agencies arresting and deporting Tibetan refugees back into China. These kinds of activities cannot be condoned as they violate internationally accepted human rights standards and humanitarian laws.

As a self-declared loktantric nation, Nepal cannot be seen enforcing hypocritical standards in aid of draconian Chinese policies in Tibet. Nepal should not be an accessory to such immoral and despicable activities. Human and political rights are not just for the Nepalis, the Tibetans in Nepal should enjoy these rights are well. As a secular state, there should not be prohibitions on Tibetan refugees gathering at Boudhha during Dalai Lama’s birthday celebration.

Nepal and Nepalis should learn to tolerate and show solidarity to the Tibetan people if we are expect similar support during the hour of their need. Conflicting standards that tout universal human rights and freedoms for purposes of convenience are morally unacceptable.

When it comes to the issue of Tibetan refugees seeking asylum in Nepal, our rights activists need to do much more to ensure their rights are protected. Moral pressure from American Senators or Indian politicians should not be our guiding principles. Rather, our own conscience should guide Nepal’s policy on Tibetan refugees.

(Note from the Nepal Horizons Editorial Team:The views and opinion expressed in this artice are that of the author and not of NHC. We request individuals with interest in Nepal to submit their views on contemporary Nepalese issues to the following e-mail address: editor@nepalhorizons.com. Pictures of contributors or images that relate to submissions are welcome).