Hidden contest: Indo-Pak quest for nuclear weapons

Published on The Kathmandu Post, Tuesday, December 26, 2000
-By Pritam S Rana

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 confirmed the long held suspicion that these regional rivals were on the firm track of developing nuclear arsenals at the expense of regional security, in order to enhance their status as major regional powers. Currently, hidden from the headlines, these powers are undertaking a massive build-up of nuclear weapons and the means to develop them. this is happening with the negligence of of the international community into this impending crisis which can at any time in the future blow into a nuclear holocaust having serious consequences to the region, if not the whole world.

Necessity: The desire to acquire nuclear weapon was first realised in India during the reign of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, if not earlier. This has direct relation to Sino-Indian hostility beginning in 1962, since when India sought to match China's enormous military power. Nuclear weapons would, the Indians believed, the ultimate guarantor of Indian security from Chinese numerical superiority in conventional forces. The 1974 so-called "peaceful nuclear explosion" marked India's entry into the limited few who possessed nuclear arms. China exploded its nuclear weapon back in 1964. The problem in South Asia was that India wasn't alone in feeling threatened from a potential superior adversary. Pakistan felt the same; it felt the might of India would challenge its "pivotal" position, as a counterweight to Indian hegemony in the region. The Kashmir dispute has further served to fuel Indo-Pak conflict to a proportion that even the lone superpower, The US, feels the bit of a chill.

Since 1974, India has had a weapons programme in its nuclear research effort. Besides, tapping on nuclear technology for power stations, the fissile material from these and other weapon dedicated nuclear plants, thousands of Indian scientists and other technical personnel are engaged in the activity of developing, producing and improving nuclear explosive devices. Dr. Abdul Kalam is one of the well known scientist engaged in the Indian effort working for the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian nuclear research institutes at Trombay and various other places. the most important source of India for nuclear technology has been Russia, which is presently willing to offer nuclear technology to other nations like Iran. Pakistan is also not far behind, although its programme is much younger to India's. More than 3,000 Pakistani scientists were working on the "Pakistani bomb" programme, headed by Dr. Abdul Qader Khan, considered the father of Pakistani nuclear programme primarily being carried out in Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta. France was one of the earliest helpers in Pakistani nuclear power programme but it later withdrew as the Pakistani initiative was known for the production of weapons. From then onwards, China served as willing to provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan under the guise of development assistance in energy sector of a friendly state.

Delivery problem: apart from the development and manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, there stands th problem of delivering them. It is noteworthy that a manned bomber in world War II delivered the first atomic weapon ever employed in war. The vulnerability of manned aircraft to deliver even conventional weapons had been realized even in that time; thousands of Allied bombers were destroyed and prevented from reaching their targets by German air defenses. The revolutionary innovation of the first ballistic missile, the V2 in Nazi Germany by the brilliant inventor Werner Von Braun was a major breakthrough in the weapon delivery technology. Barun moved to the US and helped develop US ballistic missiles while the Russians for their own programme abducted other colleagues of Braun. This is the story behind the development of long-range weapon delivery.

In our regional context, both Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon developments are being complemented by an enormous expenditure of money and time into the development of delivery system. Both these powers now realize that ballistic missiles are are the only sure means to strike their adversary with impunity. Note that there, yet, isn't an effective counter-ballistic missile system in the world. India has tested the 2,500 km range Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and has deployed shorter range Prithvi (200 km range) Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). The main Pakistani ballistic missile system is the Ghauri (1,500-2,500 km range) IRBM suspected to be based on North Korean technology. Also, Pakistan has purchased from China, M-11 series (300-600 km) SRBMs, named locally as Shaheen series. pakistan also has shorter Hatf series ballistic missiles apparently developed indigenously. However, both countries are dependent on on technology from such states as China, North Korea and and to some extent Russia, despite the latter's express denial. The US and its Western allies carefully control the dual use technologies, those that can be used in production of nuclear weapons in its exports to the third world. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect India to channelize its dramatic growth in IT industries into improving its nuclear weapons technology. Such an effort could only result in hampering its future imports of emerging technologies by further tightening of the export control regime of Western countries.

Despite, the array of ballistic missiles being developed by the two South Asian rivals, few of them have been operational. This means that the air forces of the respective nations will have to employ their existing strike aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons for the interim period until the successful development and deployment of the virtually unstoppable ballistic missiles. there also remains the challenge for both countries to develop workable command and control systems for these weapons of mass destruction along with the question who has the trigger and which side will dare to use these awesome weapons first in case of an armed conflcit between the two.

Myth of Deterrence: The Indian and Pakistani leaders and policy makers might view the addition of nuclear weapons into enhancing their national military power and prestige, this has totally failed to avert armed conflict, thus, failing in maintaining deterrence, the idea of peace which exists due to fear of mutual nuclear exchange. The Kargil War is the graphic example, where the formula of nuclear deterrence, which worked for Russia and US was buried/burnt with the dead bodies of those who fell there.

The cost in terms of money, manpower and time is in such massive proportions that these alone can provide enormously to the deprived of both countries; billions upon billions are being are poured into the making of the tools of future holocaust, only waiting for the time when one of the sides lose its rationality. The religious fervor in the rhetoric and somewhat in policy of both nations serves as a potent spice for the impending heightening of a potential crisis which can easily spill into a disaster of magnanimous proportion. Imagine the consequence to Nepal, if Calcutta docks are damaged beyond repair by a nuclear strike.
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Notes:-Credit goes to www.fas.org, Jane's, Newsweek, and various other news agencies. This analysis earned me an opportunity to write a dissertation on this subject for Army majors who wanted to attend US Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Ia sked for Rs 10,000 but they failed to produce the remuneration. I can produce this into a new book given ample research opportunity. My masters thesis can be based on this touchy but a significant issue of South Asian security. ASEAN can also be affected if sea routes to Persian Gulf is intercepted by Indo-Pak naval confrontation. japan's oil supply might need escort from Japanese navy resulting in breaking Japan's 2000 nautical mile limit imposed after WWII. US Navy might be asked to separate warring Indo-Pak ships ala 1971. The SCO naval force might overtake US Navy in sea superiority in the Indian ocean. this can result in mitigation of ANZUS treaty. Australian security wrests on this crucial pact (ref: Defense and Diplomacy issue with Australian Defense update and the issue of Jane's with news report of Admiral Dunleavy, USN saying he wanted "Russian Navy away from Pacific Islands and Oceania.