On using the army against the Maoists

The Kathmandu Post, Saturday, May 20, 2000 (published on page 4)
-Pritam S Rana
The "People's War" campaign initiated by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Mao) is entering its fifth year with the consequent loss of more than 1400 lives and property damages. Maoist leaders and their supporters aim to do away with the present system of government and this has appealed to some poor, mainly illiterate youth who have little opportunities in society. Others support it to see radical change advocated by the Maoists bring about a change from the general lack of progress and development in their remote districts despite the promises of mainstream politicians since the restoration of democracy ten years ago. The Maoists, since 1996, have continued their violent activities aimed against the administration attacking government officials, the police and party workers of the mainstream political parties. Meanwhile, the government has responded with force namely the deployment of additional police personnel and resources to the affected regions such as Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot in western Nepal.

It is ordinary civilians caught in the crossfire between the guerrillas and the police who have suffered most. Despite news of talks between the government representatives and Maoists, peaceful resolution of this conflict seems to be very remote.

In their effort to curb the terrorist activities of Maoist guerrillas, the police have suffered heavy casualties. Statistics show their loss per engagement is at par with police or in some cases they suffer greater casualties than the losses suffered by Maoists. This shows that the government is losing in the battleground. Moreover, the police have failed to destroy the guerrilla infrastructure, alienate guerrillas from the local population and have instead engaged in activities to intimidate ordinary citizens and thus served to increase people's sympathy to the cause of the Maoists.

It appears it is the right time for the government to mobilize selected units of the Royal Nepalese Army for counter-insurgency operations against Maoists. The Army has better weapons, organization, infrastructure and logistical support in order to counter the increasingly better-armed guerrillas.

The current police units engaged in operations against the Maoists have inadequate arms to fight the guerrillas. The only police rifle in use is the Lee Enfield .303 that is more than a hundred years old in design, bolt action and slow to fire. There is no weapons besides this apart from pistols and some shotguns. The Army has semi-automatic rifles and a machine gun per section (a group of about ten soldiers). Besides these, each section has a small mortar to propel bombs several hundred meters even behind hills and targets. An army battalion has heavier weapons like mortars to give indirect fire support and it can also bring in artillery and helicopters armed with machine guns and rockets for heavier fire support. Army helicopters can provide logistical support (ammunition, food and other supplies including timely evacuation of the wounded) into terrain inaccessible to vehicles and even when there is no foot trail. Presently, the Nepalese police lacking helicopters of their own are hiring private airlines helicopter at very high costs sharply increasing the already overstretched police budget. Only some time back, Maoist cadres captured a parked helicopter used by the police highlighting the lack of security in relying on civilian equipment.

Organized and trained to fight, the army will be far more effective and even cost effective in fighting the poorly and lightly armed Maoist guerrillas who presently rely on raw recruits armed with stolen police rifles and muzzle loading home made arms. Many army personnel have already some experience in the working of irregular forces while on their peacekeeping duties in Lebanon and elsewhere. The quality and caliber of the leaders of the Army, who have been trained by countries with long experience in counter-insurgency and irregular warfare like USA and Israel, is very high. These professionals are expected to create and maintain an effective intelligence gathering organization within their command (with police assistance) in order to map out Maoist guerrilla tactics, their organization including their leadership, and their whereabouts in order to assist operations to assist them. Besides, the involvement of the Army will give it experience in actual combat, thus it itself will learn many valuable lessons which it can apply in future engagement with enemies both foreign and domestic. It will also silence critics who point out that the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) has little to do and is only a ceremonial organization eating a big share of the nation's meager budget allocations.

It is imperative that the government should decide to deploy troops quickly as possible in order to rid Nepal of insurgency and terrorism. Any delays will only help the Maoists to organize, seek support both within and outside of Nepal, and equip itself with arm. Indecision will mean more casualties for police and innocent civilians. One more lesson to be learned is that if allowed to prosper, guerrilla groups tend to ally themselves with other criminal activities like the international narcotics trade in order to generate cash. This is already the case in Latin American countries like Colombia where such "rich" guerrillas are immune to government control.

The decision to use the Army will certainly be unpopular in some quarters. Critics' fear that increasing the role of the Army in the effort to fight insurgency will certainly will naturally give them more power and more say in the policy of the government. They fear such a rise in role and status might elevate the Army giving it political clout and make them the primary arbiter of power in the nation. For this they can cite examples like Chile and Myanmar where the government was overthrown by the army which established itself as the permanent ruler. We cannot deny that such feelings may already have hatched among some Nepalese politicians, especially leftist leaders who usually see the military as a rightist force. It is well known that the military in Nepal is the most loyal of the monarchist groups. This has to do with the tradition and time of the founders of Nepal, all kings, and it is to them and the country to whom the soldiers swear allegiance. However, there are means to check the seizure of power of by the Army and such fears are unfounded.

Another school of criticism might argue that the employment of the armed forces to quell guerrillas is bound to failure citing historical lessons. They can point out to the lost cause of the United States in Vietnam and the failure of the Sri Lankan Army to quell the Tamil separatists. To answer these compelling questions we have to look at the facts of those past and present conflicts. In Vietnam, the United States attempted to defend South Vietnam, a friendly state from the North Vietnamese Army and their southern proxies, primarily the National Liberation Front or Viet Cong guerrillas. The Viet Cong guerrillas, solidly backed and reinforced by the North Vietnamese Army had a clear cut aim of causing maximum casualties on the Americans to force them to leave in order to unite South Vietnam into a communist led North Vietnam. Heavily armed and led by North Vietnamese officers, the Viet Cong although losing to Americans in battlefield, achieved their aim of frustrating American public opinion by mounting American casualties and forcing them to leave Vietnam. The Maoists in Nepal are neither as heavily armed and well led as the Viet Cong nor directly aided by any of the neighboring nations in our case India and China. Besides, the CPN-Mao has no clear cut strategic aim despite their rhetoric of liberating the country of capitalists and colonialists.

Considering the case of Sri Lanka, the Nepalese Maoist crisis has little parallel as the war there is of ethnic nature. The Sri Lankan Army is fighting to regain territories controlled by Tamil separatist guerrillas, mainly the LTTE. The guerrillas who want a separate Tamil state claim they are fighting against racism by the predominant Sinhalese ethnic group against the minority Tamils. Due to some legitimacy in their claim, the Tamil separatists enjoy support of Tamil population both in Sri Lanka and abroad. From the latter group of Tamil well wishers, the separatists receive financial support to buy weapons and supplies in the international market.

Both the Viet Cong in Vietnam and the LTTE in Sri Lanka were/are known to create parallel administration in the territories they controlled from which they taxed the local population and even offered legal and other functions at par with the government administration which they replaced. It is imperative, that His Majesty's Government learn from these experiences of other countries. It should at all cost contain the Maoist guerrillas to deny it access to modern arms and it should detect and decapitate any attempted creation of a parallel guerrilla administration or shadow government.

One of the most effective means to counter guerrilla insurgency is to deny the guerrillas the refuge and support of local population. This cannot be achieved by threatening the civil populace, as this will further undermine the image of the government in people's eyes. Development support in the form of improved health care, schools, and bridges as well as employment of the uneducated youth, and a genuine environment of trust between the people of the affected area and the government with other political parties acting as catalyst is the only real solution to this lingering problem, a black blob in the face of our peaceful nation.

Finally, the government, realizing its failure to deal with the Maoists with the existing police resources, has announced the formation of a new paramilitary police force of strength of more than 15,000 personnel. The force, initially drawing personnel from the police and the Army on equal ratio, will have advanced weapons and will have one brigade (of about 3,000 strong) in each of the five development regions of Nepal. The government will spend more than a billion rupees to raise and equip this force.

The government's decision appears to have been taken in haste and is fundamentally unsound. Instead of spending this large amount of money on a new and inexperienced force, the money could have been properly utilized in training, equipping, and preparing existing brigades of the Royal Nepalese Army for counter-insurgency operation. Improved combat training devices like laser based simulators can be bought with this money and even private consultants, experts with experience of guerrilla warfare, can be hired for competent advice. Far less money will be spent if this alternative is considered. Do we really have money to waste on a new, untried, untrained and a theoretical force? It takes years to train even a single battalion (800 strong) and the government wants to train five brigades each with three battalions! In what time? The people would have long died of hunger before the mill removes the husks. The government needs sound decision and foresight in its planning.

Despite its mistakes in the past the government should learn and act fast. An insecure environment will tarnish the image of of this country as a safe and peaceful place and will affect our tourism, a crucial revenue generating sector of our national economy. A military solution is not always the best to quell dissent. But, when law and order is to be maintained and there is no other way, it is the only situation.
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